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Abstract
A large number of web applications is based on a relational database together with a program,
typically a script, that enables the user to interact with the database through embedded SQL
queries and commands. In this paper, we introduce a method for formal automated verification
of such systems which connects database theory to mainstream program analysis. We identify a
fragment of SQL which captures the behavior of the queries in our case studies, is algorithmically
decidable, and facilitates the construction of weakest preconditions. Thus, we can integrate
the analysis of SQL queries into a program analysis tool chain. To this end, we implement
a new decision procedure for the SQL fragment that we introduce. We demonstrate practical
applicability of our results with three case studies, a web administrator, a simple firewall, and a
conference management system.
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1 Introduction
Web applications are often written in a scripting language such as PHP and store their
data in a relational database which they access using SQL queries and data-manipulating
commands [36]. This combination facilitates fast development of web applications, which
exploit the reliability and efficiency of the underlying database engine and use the flexibility
of the script language to interact with the user. While the database engine is typically a
mature software product with few if any severe errors, the script with the embedded SQL
statements does not meet the same standards of quality.
With a few exceptions (such as [15, 19]) the systematic analysis of programs with
embedded-SQL statements has been a blind spot in both the database and the computer-
aided verification community. The verification community has mostly studied the analysis
of programs which fall into two classes: programs with (i) numeric variables and complex
control structure, (ii) complex pointer structures and objects; however, the modeling of
data and their relationships has not received the same attention. Research in the database
community on the other hand has traditionally focused on correct design of databases rather
than correct use of databases.
This paper lays the ground for an interdisciplinary methodology which extends the realm
of program analysis to programs with embedded SQL. Since the seminal papers of Hoare, the
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2 On the automated verification of web applications with embedded SQL
first step for developing program analysis techniques is a precise mathematical framework
for defining programming semantics and correctness. In this paper we develop a Hoare logic
for a practically useful but simple fragment of SQL, called SmpSQL, and a simple scripting
language, called SmpSL, which has access to SmpSQL statements. Specifically, we describe a
decidable logic for formulating specifications and develop a weakest precondition calculus
for SmpSL programs; thus our Hoare logic allows to automatically discharge verification
conditions. When analyzing SmpSL programs, we treat SQL as a black box library whose
semantics is given by database theory. Thus we achieve verification results relative to the
correctness of the underlying database engine.
We recall from Codd’s theorem [13] that the core of SQL is equivalent in expressive power
to first-order logic FO. Thus, it follows from Trakhtenbrot’s theorem [34] that it is undecidable
whether an SQL query guarantees a given post condition. We have therefore chosen our
SQL fragment SmpSQL such that it captures an interesting class of SQL commands, but
corresponds to a decidable fragment of first-order logic, namely FO2BD, the restriction of
first-order logic in which all variables aside from two range over fixed finite domains called
bounded domains. The decidability of the finite satisfiability problem of FO2BD follows from
that of FO2, the fragment of first-order logic which uses only two variables. Although
the decidability of FO2 was shown by Mortimer [29] and a complexity-wise tight decision
procedure was later described by Grädel, Kolaitis and Vardi [21], we provide the first efficient
implementation of finite satisfiability of FO2.
We illustrate our methodology on the example of a simple web administration tool based
on [22]. The PANDA web administrator is a simple public domain web administration
tool written in PHP. We describe in Section 2 how the core mailing-list administration
functionality falls into the scope of SmpSL. We formulate a specification consisting of a
database invariant and pre- and postconditions. Our framework allows us to automatically
check the correctness of such specifications using our own FO2BD reasoning tool.
Main contributions
1. We define SmpSQL, an SQL fragment which is contained in FO2BD.
2. We define a a simple imperative script language SmpSL with embedded SmpSQL state-
ments.
3. We give a construction for weakest preconditions in FO2BD for SmpSL.
4. We implemented the weakest precondition computation for SmpSL.
5. We implemented a decision procedure for FO2BD. The procedure is based on the decidability
and NEXPTIME completeness result for FO2 by [21], but we use a more involved algorithm
which reduces the problem to a SAT solver and is optimized for performance.
We evaluate our methodology on three applications: a web administrator, a simple
firewall, and a conference management system. We compared our tool with Z3 [14], currently
the most advanced general-purpose SMT solver with (limited) support for quantifiers. In
general, our tool performs better than Z3 in several examples for checking the validity of
verification conditions of SmpSL programs. However, our tool and Z3 have complementary
advantages: Z3 does well for unsatisfiable instances while our tool performs better on
satisfiable instances. We performed large experiments with custom-made blown up versions
of the web administrator and the firewall examples, which suggest that our tool scales well.
Moreover, we tested the scalability of our approach by comparing of our underlying FO2 solver
with three solvers on a set of benchmarks we assembled inspired by combinatorial problems.
The solvers we tested against are Z3, the SMT solver CVC4 [3], and the model checker
Nitpick [7]. Our solver outperformed each of these solvers on some of the benchmarks.
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2 Running Example
We introduce our approach on the example of a simple web service. The example is a
translation from PHP with embedded SQL commands into SmpSL of code excerpts from
the Panda web-administrator. The web service provides several services implemented in
dedicated functions for subscribing a user to a newsletter, deleting a newsletter, making a
user an admin of a newsletter, sending emails to all subscribed users of a newsletter, etc. We
illustrate our verification methodology by exposing an error in the Panda web-administrator.
The verification methodology we envision in this paper consists of (1) maintaining database
invariants and (2) verifying a contract specification for each function of the web service.
The database contains several tables including NS = NewsletterSubscription with at-
tributes nwl, user , subscribed and code. The database is a structure whose universe is
partitioned into three sets: domU, boolB, and codesB. The attributes nwl and user range
over the finite set domU, the attribute subscribed ranges over boolB = {true, false}, and the
attribute code ranges over the fixed finite set codesB. The superscripts in domU, boolB,
and codesB serve to indicate that the domain domU is unbounded, while the Boolean
domain and the domain of codes are bounded (i.e. of fixed finite size). When s = true,
(n, u, s, c) ∈ NS signifies that the user u is subscribed to the newsletter n. The process of
being (un)subscribed from/to a newsletter requires an intermediary confirmation step in
which the confirm code c plays a role.
Figure 1 provides the functions subscribe, unsubscribe, and confirm translated manu-
ally into SmpSL. 1 The comments in quotations // “. . .” originate from the PHP source
code. The intended use of these functions is as follows: In order to subscribe a user u
to a newsletter n, the function subscribe is called with inputs n and u (for example by
a web interface operated by the newsletter admin or by the user). subscribe stores the
tuple (n, u, false, new_code) in NS , where new_code is a confirmation code which does not
occur in the database, and an email containing a confirmation URL is sent to the user u.
Visiting the URL triggers a call to confirm with input new_code, which subscribes u to n by
replacing the tuple (n, u, false, new_code) of NS to with (n, u, true, nil). For unsubscribe
the process is similar, and crucially, unsubscribe uses the same confirm function. confirm
decides whether to subscribe or unsubscribe according to whether n is currently subscribed
to u. The CHOOSE command selects one row non-deterministically.
The database preserves the invariant
Inv = ∀dx, y.∀bs1, s2.∀cc1, c2.
(
(s1 = s2 ∧ c1 = c2) ∨
∨
i=1,2 ¬NS(x, y, si, ci)
)
(1)
Inv says that the pair (n, u) of newsletter and user is a key of the relation NS . The subscripts
of the quantifiers denote the domains over which the quantified variables range. In our
verification methodology we add invariants as additional conjuncts to the pre- and post-
conditions of every function. In this way invariants strengthen the pre-conditions and can be
used to prove the post-conditions of the functions. On the other hand, the post-conditions
require to re-establish the validity of the invariants.
Figure 2 provides pre- and post-conditions pref and postf for each of the three functions
f. The relation names d, b, and c are interpreted as the sets domU, boolB, and codesB,
respectively. Proving correctness amounts to proving the correctness of each of the Hoare
triples {pref ∧ Inv} f {postf ∧ Inv}. Each Hoare triple specifies a contract: after every
1 The reader may wish to compare the SmpSL implementation of confirm to the PHP implementation in
PANDA, provided in Appendix A.1.
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subscribe(n,u):
A = SELECT * FROM NS WHERE user = u AND nwl = n;
if (A != empty) exit; // "This address is already registered to this newsletter."
INSERT (n,u,false,new_code) INTO NS;
// Send confirmation email to u
unsubscribe(n,u):
A = SELECT * FROM NS WHERE user = u AND nwl = n;
if (A = empty) exit; // "This address is not registered to this newsletter."
UPDATE NS SET code = new_code WHERE user = u AND nwl = n
// Send confirmation email to u
confirm(cd):
A = SELECT subscribe FROM NS WHERE code = cd;
if (A = empty) exit; //"No such code"
s1 = CHOOSE A;
if (s1 = false) UPDATE NS SET subscribed = true, code = nil WHERE code = cd
else DELETE FROM NS WHERE code = cd;
Figure 1 Running Example: SmpSL code.
execution of f, the condition postf ∧ Inv should be satisfied if pref ∧ Inv was satisfied before
executing f. presubscribe and preunsubscribe express that new_code is an unused non-nil code
and that NSgh is equal to NS . NSgh is a ghost table, used in the post-conditions to relate
the state before the execution of the function to the state after the execution. NSgh does
not occur in the functions and is not modified. postsubscribe and postunsubscribe express that
NS is obtained from NSgh by inserting or updating a row satisfying user = u AND nwl = n
whenever the exit command is not executed. The intended behavior of confirm depends
on which function created cd. preconfirm introduces a Boolean ghost variable subgh whose
value is true (respectively false) if cd was generated as a new code in subscribe (respectively
unsubscribe). subgh does not occur in confirm. postconfirm express that, when subgh is
true, NS is obtained from NS by toggling the value of the column subscribed from false to
true in the NSgh row whose confirm code is cd; when subgh is false, NS is obtained from
NSgh by deleting the row with confirm code cd.
Let us now describe the error which prevents confirm from satisfying its specification.
Consider the following scenario. First, subscribe is called and then unsubscribe, both
with the same input n and u. Two confirm codes are created: cs by subscribe and cu by
unsubscribe. At this point, NS contains a single row for the newsletter n and user u namely
(n, u, false, cu). The user receives two confirmation emails containing the codes cs and cu.
Clicking on the confirmation URL for cs (i.e. running confirm(cs)) has no effect since cs
does not occur in the database. However, clicking on the confirmation URL for cs results in
subscribing u to n. This is an error, since confirming a code created in unsubscribe should
not lead to a subscription.
Our tool automatically checks whether the program satisfies its specification. If not, the
programmer or verification engineer may try to refine the specification to adhere more closely
to the intended behavior (e.g. by adding an invariant). In this case, the program is in fact
incorrect, so no meaningful correct specification can be written for it.
In Section 3.3 we describe a weakest-precondition calculus wp[[·]] which allows us to
automatically derive the weakest precondition for a post-condition with regard to a SmpSL
program. For our example functions f, wp[[·]] allows us to automatically derive wp[[f]]postf.
The basic property of the weakest precondition is that postf holds after f has executed iff
wp[[f]]postf held immediately at the start of the execution. It then remains to show that
the pre-condition pref implies wp[[f]]postf. This amounts to checking the validity of the
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preg = NS = NSgh ∧ good-code(new_code)
good-code(c′) = c(c′) ∧ (c′ 6= nil) ∧ ∀dx, y. ∀bs.¬NS(x, y, s, c′)
postg = ∀dx, y. ∀bs. ∀cc.NS(x, y, s, c)↔ (ϕg,1 ∨ ϕg,2)
ϕsubscribe,1 = NSgh(x, y, s, c)
ϕsubscribe,2 = (n = x) ∧ (u = y) ∧ (s = false) ∧ (c = new_code)
∧¬∃bs′. ∃cc′.NSgh(n, u, s′, c′)
ϕunsubscribe,1 = (n 6= x) ∧ (u 6= y) ∧NSgh(x, y, s, c)
ϕunsubscribe,2 = (n = x) ∧ (u = y) ∧ (c = new_code) ∧ ∃cc′.NSgh(n, u, s, c′)
preconfirm = NS = NSgh ∧ b(subgh)
postconfirm =
∧
tt∈b subgh = tt → (∀dx, y. ∀bs. ∀cc.NS(x, y, s, c)↔ ψtt)
ψfalse = cd 6= c ∧NSgh(x, y, s, c)
ψtrue = cd 6= c ∧NSgh(x, y, s, c) ∨ (c = nil ∧ s = true ∧NSgh(x, y, false, cd))
Figure 2 Running Example: Pre- and post-conditions. g is either subscribe or unsubscribe.
verification conditions VC f = pref → wp[[f]]postf.
Our reasoner for FO2 sentences is the back-end for our verification tool. The specification
in this example is all in FO2BD. The weakest precondition of a SmpSL program applied to a
FO2BD sentence gives again a FO2BDsentence. Hence VC f are all in FO2BD. Automatically
deciding the validity of FO2BD sentences using our FO2 decision procedure is described in
Section 4. Recall that codesB is of fixed finite size. Here |codesB| = 3 is sufficient to detect
the error. Observe that the same confirm code may be reused once it is replaced with nil
in confirm, so the size of the database is unbounded. The size of codesB must be chosen
manually when applying our automatic tool.
A simple way to correct the error in confirm is by adding subgh as a second argument
of confirm and replacing if (s1 = false) · · · with if (subgh = false) · · · . Since s1 is
no longer used, the CHOOSE command can be deleted. The value of subgh received by
confirm is set correctly by subscribe and unsubscribe. With these changes, the error is
fixed and confirm satisfies its specification. In the scenario from above, the call to confirm
with cs and subgh = true leaves the database unchanged, while the call to confirm with cu
and subgh = false deletes the row (n, u, false, cu).
3 Verification of SmpSL Programs
Here we introduce our programming language and our verification methodology. We introduce
the SQL fragment SmpSQL in Section 3.1 and the scripting language SmpSL in Section 3.2.
In Section 3.3 we explain the weakest precondition transformer of SmpSL, and we show how
discharging verification conditions of FO2BD specification reduces to reasoning in FO2.
3.1 The SQL fragment SmpSQL
3.1.1 Data model of SmpSQL
The data model of SmpSQL is based on the presentation of the relational model in Chapter 3.1
of [2]. We assume finite sets of domB1 , . . . ,domBs called the bounded domains and an infinite
set domU called the unbounded domain. The domains are disjoint. We assume three disjoint
countably infinite sets: the set of attributes att, the set of relation names relnames, and the
set of variables SQLvars. We assume a function sort : att→ {domU,domB1 , . . . ,domBs }.
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A table or a relation schema is a relation name and a finite sequence of attributes. The
attributes are the names of the columns of the table. The arity ar(R) of a relation schema
R is the number of its attributes. A database schema is a non-empty finite set of tables.
A database instance I of a database schema R is a many-sorted structure with finite
domains dom0 ⊆ domU and domj = domBj for 1 ≤ j ≤ s. We denote by sortI the
function obtained from sort by setting sortI(att) = dom0 whenever sort(att) = domU.
The relation schema R = (relname, att1, . . . , atte) is interpreted in I as a relation RI ⊆
sortI(att1)× · · · × sortI(atte). A row is a tuple in a relation RI .
A database schema R is valid for SmpSQL if for all relation schemas R with attributes
att1, . . . , atte in R, there are at most two attributes attj for which sort(attj) = domU. In
the sequel we assume that all database schemas are valid. The SmpSQL commands will be
allowed to use variables from SQLvars. We denote members of SQLvars by p, p1, etc.
3.1.2 Queries in SmpSQL
Given a relation schema R and attributes att1, . . . , attn of R, the syntax of SELECT is:
〈Select〉 ::= SELECT atta1 , . . . , attai FROM R WHERE 〈Condition〉
〈Condition〉 ::= attb1 , . . . , attbj IN 〈Select〉 | 〈Condition〉 AND 〈Condition〉 |
〈Condition〉 OR 〈Condition〉 | NOT 〈Condition〉 | attm = p
where p is a variable and 1 ≤ m, a1, . . . , ai, b1, . . . , bj ≤ n. The semantics of 〈Select〉 is the
set of tuples from the projection of R on atta1 , . . . , attai which satisfy 〈Condition〉. The
condition attm = p indicates that the set of rows of R in which the attribute attm has value p
is selected. The condition attb1 , . . . , attbi IN 〈Select〉 selects the set of rows of R in which
attb1 , . . . , attbi are mapped to one of the tuples queried in the nested query 〈Select〉.
3.1.3 Data-manipulating commands in SmpSQL
SmpSQL supports the three primitive commands INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE.
Let R be a relation schema with attributes att1, . . . , attn. Let p, p1, . . . , pn be variables
from SQLvars. The syntax of the primitive commands is:
〈Insert〉 ::= INSERT (p1, . . . , pn) INTO R
〈Update〉 ::= UPDATE R SET attm = p WHERE 〈Condition〉
〈Delete〉 ::= DELETE FROM R WHERE 〈Condition〉
The semantics of INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE is given in the natural way. We
allow update commands which set several attributes simultaneously. We assume that the
data manipulating commands are used in a domain-correctness fashion, i.e. INSERT and
UPDATE may only assign values from sort(attk) to any attribute attk.
3.2 The script language SmpSL
3.2.1 Data model of SmpSL
The data model of SmpSL extends that of SmpSQL with constant names and additional
relation schemas. We assume a countably infinite set of constant names connames, which
is disjoint from att,domU,domB1 , . . . ,domBs , relnames but contains SQLvars.
A state schema is a database schema R expanded with a tuple of constant names const.
A state interprets a state schema. It consists of a database instance I expanded with a tuple
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of universe elements constI interpreting const. In programs, the constant names play the
role of local variables, domain constants (e.g. true and true) and of inputs to the program2.
3.2.2 SmpSL programs
The syntax of SmpSL is given by
〈Program〉 ::= 〈Command〉 | 〈Program〉 ; 〈Command〉
〈Command〉 ::= 〈Insert〉 | 〈Update〉 | 〈Delete〉 | R = 〈Select〉 | d¯ = CHOOSE R |
if (cond) 〈Program〉 else 〈Program〉 | if (cond) exit
Every data-manipulating command C of SmpSQL is a SmpSL command. The semantics
of C in SmpSL is the same as in SmpSQL, with the caveat that the variables receive their
values from their interpretations (as constant names) in the state, and C is only legal if all
the variables of C indeed appear in the state schema as constant names.
The command R = 〈Select〉 assigns the result of a SmpSQL query to a relation schema
R ∈ R whose arity and attribute sorts match the select query. Executing the command in a
state (I, constI) sets RI to the relation selected by S, leaving the interpretation of all other
names unchanged. The variables in the query receive their values from their interpretations
in the state, and for the command to be legal, all variables in the query must appear in the
state schema as constant names.
Given a relation schema R ∈ R with attributes att1, . . . , attn and a tuple d¯ = (d1, . . . , dn)
of constant names from const, d¯ = CHOOSE R is a SmpSL command. If RI is empty, the
command has no effect. If RI is not empty, executing this command sets (dI1 , . . . , dIn) to the
value of a non-deterministically selected row from RI .
The branching commands have the natural semantics. Two types of branching conditions
cond are allowed: (R = empty) and (R != empty), which check whether RI is the empty set,
and (c1 = c2) and (c1! = c2), which check whether cI1 = cI2 .
See Fig. 1 for examples of SmpSL programs.
3.3 Verification of SmpSL programs
3.3.1 SQL and FO
It is well-established that a core part of SQL is captured by FO by Codd’s classical theorem
relating the expressive power of relational algebra to relational calculus. While SQL goes
beyond FO in several aspects, such as aggregation, grouping, and arithmetic operations
(see [27]), these aspects are not allowed in SmpSQL. Hence, FO is especially suited for
reasoning about SmpSQL and SmpSL.
The notions of state schema and state fit naturally in the syntax and semantics of FO. In
the sequel, a vocabulary is a tuple of relation names and constant names. For a FO-formula
ψ, we write voc(ψ) for the vocabulary consisting of the relation names and constant names
in ψ. Every state schema R is a vocabulary. A state (I, constI) interpreting a state schema
R and a tuple of constant names const is an
〈
R, const
〉
-structure.
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[[atti = c]]R =̂ vi = c
[[attb1 , . . . , attbj IN S1]]R =̂ [[S1]][vbk/vk : 1 ≤ k ≤ j]
[[cond1 AND cond2]]R =̂ [[cond1]]R ∧ [[cond2]]R
[[cond1 OR cond2]]R =̂ [[cond1]]R ∨ [[cond2]]R
[[NOT cond1]]R =̂ ¬[[cond1]]R
[[SELECT atta1 , . . . , attai FROM R WHERE cond]] =̂ (∃vai+1 , . . . , vanR(v¯) ∧ [[cond]]R)[v`/va` : 1 ≤ ` ≤ i]
where {a1, . . . , an} = {1, . . . , n}
wp[[INSERT (c1, . . . , cn) INTO R]]Q =̂ Q
[
R(α¯) ∨∧n
i=1 αi = ci
/
R(α¯)
]
wp[[DELETE FROM R WHERE cond]]Q =̂ Q
[
R(α¯) ∧ ¬[[cond]]R[αi/vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n]
/
R(α¯)
]
wp[[UPDATE R SET attj = c WHERE cond]]Q =̂ Q
[
R(α¯) ∧ ¬[[cond]]R[αi/vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n] ∨
∃vjR(αj) ∧ [[cond]]R[αji/vi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n] ∧ αj = c/
R(α¯)
]
Figure 3 Rules for weakest precondition for SmpSQL basic commands. We denote by R a
relation schema with attributes 〈att1, . . . , attn〉. We write αji for αi if i 6= j, and for vi if i = j. We
denote v¯ = (v1, . . . , vn), α¯ = (α1, . . . , αn), and αj = (αj1, . . . , αjn). Note that each of the last three
rows Q
[
expr(α)
/
R(α¯)
]
substitutes every occurrence of R with an updated expression expr .
3.3.2 Hoare verification of SmpSL programs and weakest precondition
Hoare logic is a standard program verification methodology [23]. Let P be a SmpSL program
and let ϕpre and ϕpost be FO-sentences. A Hoare triple is of the form {ϕpre}P{ϕpost}. A
Hoare triple is a contract relating the state before the program is run with the state afterward.
The goal of the verification process is to prove that the contract is correct.
Our method of proving that a Hoare triple is valid reduces the problem to that of finite
satisfiability of a FO-sentence. We compute the weakest precondition wp[[P ]]ϕpost of ϕpost
with respect to the program P . The weakest precondition transformer was introduced in
Dijkstra’s classic paper [17], c.f. [24]. Let AP denote the state after executing P on the initial
state A. The main property of the weakest precondition is: AP |= ϕpost iff A |= wp[[P ]]ϕpost .
Using wp[[·]] we can rephrase the problem of whether the Hoare triple {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} is
valid in terms of FO reasoning on finite structures: Is the FO-sentence ϕpre → wp[[P ]]ϕpost a
tautology? Equivalently, is the FO-sentence ϕpre ∧¬wp[[P ]]ϕpost unsatisfiable? Section 3.3.3
discusses the resulting FO reasoning task.
We describe the computation of the weakest precondition inductively for SmpSQL and
SmpSL. The weakest precondition for SmpSQL is given in Fig. 3, and for SmpSL in Fig. 4.
For SmpSQL conditions, [[·]]R is a formula with n free first-order variables v1, . . . , vn for a con-
ditional expression in the context of relation schema R of arity n. [[SELECT · · · FROM R · · · ]]
is also a formula with free variables v1, . . . , vn describing the rows selected by the SELECT
query. The rules wp[[s]]Q transform a (closed) formula Q, which is a postcondition of the
command s, into a (closed) formula expressing the weakest precondition. The notation ψ[t/v]
indicates substitution of all free occurrences of the variable v in ψ by the term t.
The notation ψ
[
θ(α1, . . . , αn)/R(α1, . . . , αn)] indicates that any atomic sub-formula of ψ
of the form R(α1, . . . , αn) (for any α1, . . . , αn) is replaced by θ(α1, . . . , αn) (with the same
α1, . . . , αn). The formula θ(v1, . . . , vn) has n free variables, and θ(α1, . . . , αn) is obtained by
2 We deviate from [2] in the treatment of constants in that we do not assume that constant names are
always interpreted as distinct members of domU. This is so since several program variables or inputs
can have the same value.
S. Itzhaky, T. Kotek, N. Rinetzky, M. Sagiv, O. Tamir, H. Veith, and F. Zuleger 9
[[c1 = c2]] =̂ c1 = c2
[[c1 != c2]] =̂ c1 6= c2
[[R ! = empty]] =̂ ∃v1, . . . , vnR(v1, . . . , vn)
[[R= empty]] =̂ ¬∃v1, . . . , vnR(v1, . . . , vn)
wp[[R = SELECT · · · ]]Q =̂ Q
[
[[SELECT · · · ]](α1, . . . , αn)
/
R(α1, . . . , αn)
]
wp[[(d1, . . . , dn) = CHOOSE R]]Q =̂ ∀u1, . . . , un
(
R(u1, . . . , un)→ Q[ui/di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n]
)
wp[[if cond s1 else s2]]Q =̂ (¬[[cond]] ∧ wp[[s2]]Q) ∨ ([[cond]] ∧ wp[[s1]]Q)
Figure 4 Rules for weakest precondition construction for SmpSL basic commands. The weakest
precondition of if cond exit; s2 is the same as that of if !cond s2.
substituting each vi into αi. The αi may be variables or constant names.
The weakest precondition of a SmpSL program is obtained by applying the weakest
precondition of its commands.
3.3.3 The specification logic FO2BD and decidability of verification
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, using the weakest precondition, the problem of verifying
Hoare triples can be reduced to the problem of checking satisfiability of a FO-sentence
by a finite structure. While this problem is not decidable in general by Trakhtenbrot’s
theorem, it is decidable for a fragment of FO we denote FO2BD, which extends the classical
two-variable fragment FO2. The logic FO2 is the set of all FO formulas which use only
variables the variables x and y. The vocabularies of FO2-sentences are not allowed function
names, only relation and constanst names. Note FO2 cannot express that a relation name
is interpreted as a function. FO2 contains the equality symbol =. FO2BD extends FO2 by
allowing quantification on an unbounded number of variables, under the restriction that all
variables besides from x and y range over the bounded domains only.
FO2BD is the language of our invariants and pre- and postconditions, see Eq. (1) and
Fig. 2 in Section 2. An important property of FO2BD is that it is essentially closed under
taking weakest precondition according to Figs. 3 and 4 since all relation schemas in a (valid)
database schema have at most 2 attributes whose sort is domU. We reduce the task of
reasoning over FO2BD to reasoning over FO2.
I Theorem 1. Let {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} be a Hoare triple such that both ϕpre and ϕpost belong to
FO2BD. The problem of deciding whether {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} is valid is decidable.
(sketch). By Section 3.3.2, {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} is valid iff θ = ¬(ϕpre∧¬wp[[P ]]ϕpost) is satisfiable
by a finite structure. We take the simplifying assumption that in all the tables, the sort of
the first and second attributes att1 and att2 is domU. This assumption does not effect the
expressive power of SmpSL. Examination of the weakest precondition rules in Figs. 3 and 4
reveals that the only variables ranging over the unbounded domain are v1 and v2. Let θ′
be the FO2BD sentence obtained from θ by substituting v1 and v2 with x and y respectively,
and restricting the range of the quantifiers appropriately: for a command manipulating or
querying a table R with attributes att1, . . . , attn in Figs. 3 and 4, each quantifier ∀vk or
∃vk is replaced with ∀sort(attk)vk or ∃sort(attk)vk. We compute an FO2 sentence θ′′ which
is equivalent to θ′ by hard-coding the bounded domains. Every table T which contains an
attribute att with sort(att) = domBj of size d is replaced with d tables T1, . . . , Td which do
not have the attribute att. This change is reflected in θ′′, e.g. existential quantification is
replaced with disjunction. By the decidability of finite satisfiability of FO2-sentences, we get
that the problem of deciding whether {ϕpre}P{ϕpost} is valid is decidable. J
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4 FO2 Reasoning
4.1 The bounded model property of FO2
Section 4 is devoted to our algorithm for FO2 finite satisfiability. The main ingredient for
this algorithm is the bounded model property, which guarantees that if an FO2(τ) sentence φ
over vocabulary τ is satisfiable by any τ -structure – finite or infinite – it is satisfiable by a
finite τ -structure whose cardinality is bounded by a computable function of φ. The bound
guaranteed in the first decidability proof of the finite satisfiability problem by Mortimer [29]
was doubly exponential in the size of the formula. Later, Grädel, Kolaitis and Vardi [21]
proved the exponential model property, from which we get that the problem is NEXPTIME-
complete. The naive NEXPTIME algorithm arising from the exponential model property
amounts to computing the exponential bound bnd(φ) from [21], non-deterministically guessing
t ≤ bnd(φ) and a τ -structure A with universe {1, . . . , t}, checking whether A satisfies φ, and
answering accordingly. Since the truth-value of FO-sentences is invariant to τ -isomorphisms,
a τ -structure of cardinality at most bnd(φ) satisfies φ iff such a structure with universe
{1, . . . , t}, t ≤ bnd(φ), satisfies φ. Appendix D.3 discusses a more refined version of the
bound from [21].
4.2 Finite satisfiability using a SAT solver
Our algorithm for FO2 finite satisfiability reduces the problem of finding a satisfying model
of cardinality bounded by bnd to the satisfiability of a propositional Boolean formula in
Conjunctive Normal Form CNF, which is then solved using a SAT solver. The bound in
[21] is given for formulas in Scott Normal Form (SNF) only. We use a refinement of SNF
we call Skolemized Scott Normal Form (SSNF). The CNF formula we generate encodes the
semantics of the sentence ψ on a structure whose universe cardinality is bounded by bnd.
An early precursor for the use of a SAT solver for finite satsifiability is [28].
4.2.1 Skolemized Scott Normal Form
An FO2-sentence is in Skolemized Scott Normal Form if it is of the form
∀x∀y
(
α(x, y) ∧
m∧
i=1
Fi(x, y)→ βi(x, y)
)
∧
m∧
i=1
∀x∃y Fi(x, y) (2)
where α and βi, i = 1, . . . ,m, are quantifier-free formulas which do not contain any Fj ,
j = 1, . . . ,m. Note that Fi are relation names.
I Proposition 1. Let τ be a vocabulary and φ be a FO2(τ)-sentence. There are polynomial-
time computable vocabulary σ ⊇ τ and FO2(σ)-sentence ψ such that (a) ψ is in SSNF; (b)
The set of cardinalities of the models of φ is equal to the corresponding set for ψ; and (c)
The size of ψ is linear in the size of φ.
Proposition 1 follows from the discussion before Proposition 3.1 in [21], by applying an
additional normalization step converting SNF sentences to SSNF sentences.34
3 The word Skolemized is used in reference to the standard Skolemization process of eliminating existential
quantifiers by introducing fresh function names called Skolem functions. In our case, since function
names are not allowed in our fragment, we introduce the relation names Fi, to which we refer as Skolem
relations. Moreover, we cannot eliminate the existential quantifiers entirely, but only simplify the
formulas in their scope to the atoms Fi(x, y).
4 The linear size of ψ uses our relation symbols have arity at most 2 to get rid of a log factor in [21].
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4.2.2 The CNF formula
Given the sentence ψ in SSNF from Eq. (2) and a bound bnd(ψ), we build a CNF propositional
Boolean formula Cψ which is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable. The formula Cψ will serve as the
input to the SAT solver. First we construct a related CNF formula Bψ. The crucial property
of Bψ is that it is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a model of cardinality exactly bnd(ψ).
It is convenient to assume ψ does not contain constants. If ψ did contain constants c,
they could be replaced by unary relations Uc of size 1. Being an unary relation of size 1 is
definable in FO2. Any atom containing c cannot use both x and y, and hence the universe
member interpreting c can be quantified: e.g. R(x, c) is replaced with ∃y Uc(y)∧R(x, y). Let
const(ψ) be the set of unary relations Uc corresponding to constants.
We start by introducing the variables and clauses which guarantee that Bψ encodes a
structure with the universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}. Later, we will add clauses to guarantee that
this structure satisfies ψ. For every unary relation name U in ψ and `1 ∈ {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)},
let vU,`1 be a propositional variable. For every binary relation name R in ψ and `1, `2 ∈
{1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}, let vR,`1,`2 be a propositional variable. The variables vU,`1 and vR,`1,`2
encode the interpretations of the unary and binary relation names U and R in the straight-
forward way (defined precisely below). Let Vψ be the set of all variables vU,`1 and vR,`1,`2 .
Given an assignment S to the variables of Vψ we define the unique structure AS as follows:
1. The universe AS of AS is {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)};
2. An unary relation name U is interpreted as the set {`1 ∈ AS | S(vU,`1) = True};
3. A binary relation name R is interpreted as the set {(`1, `2) ∈ A2S | S(vR,`1,`2) = True};
For every structure A with universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)}, there is S such that A = AS.
Before defining Bψ precisely we can already state the crucial property of Bψ:
I Proposition 2. ψ is satisfiable by a structure with universe {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)} iff Bψ is
satisfiable.
The formula Bψ is the conjunction of Beq, B∀∃, and B∀∀, described in the following.
The equality symbol. The equality symbol requires special attention. Let
Beq =
∧
1≤`1 6=`2≤m
(¬v=,`1,`2) ∧
∧
1≤`≤m
v=,`,`
Beq enforces that the equality symbol is interpreted correctly as the equality relation on
universe elements.
The ∀∃-conjuncts. For every conjunct ∀x∃y Fi(x, y) and 1 ≤ `1 ≤ bnd(ψ), let B∀∃i,`1 be the
clause
∨bnd(ψ)
`2=1 vFi,`1,`2 . This clause says that there is at least one universe element `2 such
that AS |= F (`1, `2). Let
B∀∃ =
∧
1≤i≤m
∧
1≤`1≤bnd(ψ)
B∀∃i,`1
For every truth-value assignment S to Vψ, AS satisfies
∧m
i=1 ∀x∃y Fi(x, y) iff S satisfies B∀∃.
The ∀∀-conjunct. Let ∀x∀y α′ be the unique ∀∀-conjunct of ψ. For every 1 ≤ `1, `2 ≤
bnd(ψ), let α′′`1,`2 denote the propositional formula obtained from the quantifier-free FO
2
formula α′ by substituting every atom a with the corresponding propositional variable for `1
and `2 as follows:
U(x) 7→ vU,`1 , R(y, y) 7→ vR,`2,`2 , R(x, x) 7→ vR,`1,`1
U(y) 7→ vU,`2 , R(x, y) 7→ vR,`1,`2 , R(y, x) 7→ vR,`2,`1
Let B∀∀`1,`2 be the Tseitin transformation of α
′′
`1,`2
to CNF [35], see also [6, Chapter 2]. The
Tseitin transformation introduces a linear number of new variables of the form uγ`1,`2 , one for
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FO2-solver Z3
web-subscribe 2.62s 0.08s
web-unsubscribe 0.779s OM
firewall 0.876s OM
conf-bid 0.451s 0.015s
conf-assign 0.369s 0.013s
conf-display 0.992s 0.016s
incorrect
FO2-solver Z3
web-subscribe 1.07s 0.1s
web-unsubscribe 8.209s 0.1s
firewall 2.82s 0.103s
conf-bid TO 0.22s
conf-assign 1.196s 0.2s
conf-display TO 0.16s
correct
Table 1 Running time comparison for example benchmarks
each sub-formula γ of α′′`1,`2 . The transformation guarantees that, for every assignment S of
Vψ, S satisfies α′′`1,`2 iff S can be expanded to satisfy B
∀∀
`1,`2
. Let
B∀∀ =
∧
1≤`1,`2≤bnd(ψ)
B∀∀`1,`2(`1, `2)
Appendix D.1 gives the construction of the CNF formula B∀∀ according to the Tseitin
transformation explicitly.
The construction of Bψ is finished and Proposition 2 holds. Note that [21] guarantees
only that bnd(ψ) is an upper bound on the cardinality of a satisfying model. Therefore, we
build a formula Cψ based on Bψ such that Cψ is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a structure
of cardinality at most bnd(ψ). We leave the technical details of the construction of Cψ to the
appendix. The algorithm for finite satisfiability of a FO2-sentence φ consists of computing
the SSNF ψ of φ and returning the result of a satisfiability check using a SAT solver on Cψ.
Both the number of variables and the number of clauses in CUni(ψ) are quadratic in bnd(ψ).
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Details of our tools
The verification condition generator described in Section 3.3.2 is implemented in Java, JFlex
and CUP. It is employed to parse the schema, precondition and postcondition and the SmpSL
programs. The tool checks that the pre and post conditions are specified in FO2 and that the
scheme is well defined. The SMT-LIB v2 [4] standard language is used as the output format
of the verification condition generator. We compare the behavior of our FO2-solver with Z3
on the verification condition generator output. The validity of the verification condition can
be checked by providing its negation to the SAT solver. If the SAT solver exhibits a satisfying
assignment then that serves as counterexample for the correctness of the program. If no
satisfying assignment exists, then the generated verification condition is valid, and therefore
the program satisfies the assertions. The FO2-solver described in Section 4 is implemented
in python and uses pyparsing to parse the SMT-LIB v2 [4] file. The FO2-solver assumes a
FO2-sentence as input and uses Lingeling [5] SAT solver as a base Solver.
5.2 Example applications
We tried our approach with a few programs inspired by real-life applications. The first case
study is a simplified version of the newsletter functionality included in the PANDA web
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administrator, that was already discussed and is shown in Fig. 1.5 The second is an excerpt
from a firewall that updates a table of which device is allowed to send packets to which
other device. See Appendix C for the code and specifications of the firewall. The third is
a conference management system with a database of papers, and transactions to manage
the review process: reviewers first bid on papers from the pool of submissions, with a policy
that a users cannot bid for papers with which they are conflicted. The chair then assigns
reviewers to papers by selecting a subset of the bids. At any time, users can ask to display
the list of papers, with some details, but the system may hide some confidential information,
in particular, users should not be able to see the status of papers before the program is made
public. We show how our system detects an information flow bug in which the user might
learn that some papers were accepted prematurely by examining the session assignments.
This bug is based on a bug we observed in a real system. See Appendix B for the code
and specifications of the conference management system. Each example comes with two
specifications, one correct and the other incorrect.
The running time in seconds for all of our examples is reported in Table 1. Timeout is
set to 60 minutes and denoted as TO. If the solver reaches out of memory we mark it as OM.
On the set of correct examples, both solvers answer within a few seconds, Z3 terminates
within milliseconds, while FO2-solver takes a few seconds and times out on some of them.
On the set of incorrect examples, Z3 fails to answer while our solver performs well. Note
that correct examples correspond to unsatisfiable FO2-sentences, while incorrect examples
correspond to satisfiable FO2-sentences.
5.3 Examining scalability
Inflated examples. In order to evaluate scalability to large examples we inflated our base
examples. For instance, while the subscribe example from Table 1 consisted of the subscription
of one new email to a mailing-list, Table 2 presents analogous examples in which multiple
emails are subscribed to multiple mailing-lists. The column multiplier details the number of
individual subscriptions in each example program. The unsubscribe and firewall example
programs are inflated similarly (see Appendix C.1).
We have tested both our FO2-solver and Z3 on large examples and the results reported
in Table 2. The high-level of the results is similar to the case of the small examples. On the
incorrect examples set Z3 continues to fail mostly due to running out of memory, though it
succeeds on the subscribe example. On the correct examples set Z3 continues to outperform
the FO2-solver.
Artificial examples. In addition, we constructed a set of artificial benchmarks comprising
of several families of FO2-sentences. Each family is parameterized by a number that
controls the size of the sentences (roughly corresponding to the number of quantifiers in the
sentence). These problems are inspired by combinatorial problems such as graph coloring
and paths. We ran experiments using the FO2-solver and three publicly available solvers:
Z3, CVC4 (which are SMT solvers), and Nitpick (a model checker). The results are collected
in Table 3. The artificial benchmarks are available at http://forsyte.at/wp-content/
uploads/artificial-smt2.tar.gz.
5 We omit the confirmation step due to a missing feature in the implementation of the weakest precondition,
however the final version of the tool will support the code from Table 1.
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FO2-solver Z3
multiplier 1 10 100 1 10 100
incorrect subscribe 2.62s 0.973s 4.04s 0.08s 0.126s 0.203s
unsubscribe 0.779s 0.529s 1.27s OM OM OM
firewall 0.876s 0.723s 2.251s OM OM OM
correct subscribe 1.07s 98.249s TO 0.1s 0.11s 0.116s
unsubscribe 8.209s 456.308s TO 0.1s 0.157s 0.201s
firewall 2.82s 50.142s 2951.882s 0.103s 0.121s 0.143s
Table 2 Running time comparison on inflated examples
size status Z3 CVC4 Nitpick FO2-solver
2col 3 unsat 0m0.037s 0m0.076s TO TO
4 sat TO TO 0m7.038s 0m5.433s
5 unsat 0m0.702s 0m0.477s TO TO
6 sat TO TO 0m8.973s 0m9.323s
10 sat TO TO 0m37.944s 0m19.580s
11 unsat 1m32.664s 0m30.912s TO TO
14 sat TO TO 2m13.661s TO
40 sat TO TO TO TO
alternating-paths 2 sat 0m0.049s TO 0m11.144s 0m1.105s
100 sat TO TO TO 0m9.671s
alternating-simple-paths 3 sat TO TO TO 0m6.754s
4 sat TO TO TO 0m10.128s
7 sat TO TO TO TO
10 sat TO TO TO TO
exponential 3 sat TO TO 0m12.255s 0m1.847s
4 sat TO TO 0m15.358s 11m6.482s
one-var-alternating-sat 300 sat 0m0.037s 0m0.497s 0m11.605s 0m9.720s
one-var-alternating-unsat 5 unsat 0m0.026s 0m0.073s 0m22.537s 0m54.198s
one-var-nested-exists-sat 300 sat 0m0.031s 0m0.045s 0m7.132s 0m0.562s
one-var-nested-forall-sat 500 sat 0m0.033s TO 0m7.183s 0m7.318s
path-unsat 2 unsat 0m0.033s 0m0.044s TO 1m37.099s
3 unsat 0m0.030s 0m0.062s TO 1m35.451s
6 unsat 0m0.037s 0m0.891s TO 1m39.209s
Table 3 Running time comparison on artificial benchmarks
Scalability of FO2-solver. We shall conclude that the FO2-solver, despite being a proof of
concept in python with minimal optimizations, handles well incorrect specifications (satisfiable
sentences) and also scales well on them. However it struggles on the correct specifications
and does not scale well. This suggests that in future work we may choose to run both our
solver and Z3 in parallel and answer according the first answer obtained. We also intend to
explore how to improve the performance of our solver in the case of incorrect examples. By
construction, whenever FO2-solver finds a satisfying model, its size is at most 4 times that of
the minimal model. (The constant 4 can be decreased or increased. )
6 Discussion
Related work. Verification of database-centric software systems has received increasing
attention in recent years [15]. Tools from program analysis and model-checking are used to
reason about the correctness of programs which access a database. Unlike our approach, the
services accessing the database are usually provided a priori in terms of a specification in the
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style of a local contract [30, 26]. The code of the services themselves may be automatically
synthesized from the specification, cf. e.g. [19, 20, 15, 16]. The focus of verification then is on
global temporal properties of the system assuming the local contracts. In contrast, out goal is
to verify that the input code (written by a programmer rather than generated automatically)
is correct with respect to a local specification. We discuss this also in Section 6.
Several papers use variations of FO2 to study verification of programs that manipulate
relational information. [8] presents a verification methodology based on FO2, a description
logic and a separation logic for analyzing the shapes and content of in-memory data structures.
[32] develops a logic similar to FO2 to reason about shapes of data structures. In both [8]
and [32], the focus is on analysis of shapes in dynamically-allocated memory, and databases
are not studied. Furthermore, no tools based on these works are available. A description
logic related to FO2 was used in [9] to verify that graph databases preserve the satisfaction of
constraints as they evolve. The focus of this work is on the correctness of the database, rather
than the programs manipulating it. The verification method suggested was not implemented.
In fact, to our knowledge no description logic solver implements reasoning tasks for the
description logic counterpart of FO2 studied in [9], not even solvers for expressive description
logics such as SROIQ.
Verification of script programs with embedded queries has revolved around security,
see [18]. However, it seems no other work has been done on such programs.
Conclusion and future work. We developed a verification methodology for script programs
with access to a relational database via SQL. We isolated a simple but useful fragment
SmpSQL of SQL and developed a simple script programming language SmpSL on top
of it. We have shown that verifying the correctness of SmpSL programs with respect to
specifications in FO2BD is decidable. We implemented a solver for the FO2 finite satisfiability
problem, and, based on it, a verification tool for SmpSL programs. Our experimental results
are very promising and suggest that our approach has great potential to evolve into a
mainstream method for the verification of script programs with embedded SQL statements.
While we believe that many of the SQL statements that appear in real-life programs fall
into our fragment SmpSQL it is evident that future tools need to consider all of database
usage in real-world programs. In future work, we will explore the extension of SmpSL
and SmpSQL. Our next goal is to be able to verify large, real-life script programs such as
Moodle [1], whose programming language and SQL statements use e.g. some arithmetic or
simple inner joins. To do so, we will adapt our approach from the custom-made syntax
of SmpSL to a fragment of PHP. We will both explore decidable logics extending FO2BD,
and investigate verification techniques based on undecidable logics including the use of first-
order theorem provers such as Vampire [33, 25] and abstraction techniques which guarantee
soundness but may result in spurious errors [12]. For dealing with queries with transitive
closure, it is natural to consider fragments of Datalog [10].
A natural extension is to consider global temporal specifications in addition to local
contracts. Here the goal is to verify properties of the system which can be expressed in a
temporal logic such as Linear Temporal Logic LTL [31, 11]. The approach surveyed in [15],
which explore global temporal specifications of services given in terms of local contracts, may
be a good basis for studying global temporal specifications in our context.
Another research direction which emerges from the experiments in Section 5 is to explore
how to improve the performance of our FO2 solver on unsatisfiable inputs.
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A PANDA web administrator
A.1 PANDA Source Code: confirm.php
We present the code of newsletters/confirm.php from PANDA Web Administrator version
1.0rc2 in Fig. 5. The code was translated manually to the confirm function in Fig. 1. The
biggest difference between the PHP code and the SmpSL code is that the PHP code uses
dbh->getRow to perform an SQL query which returns one row, whereas in SmpSL this is
divided into two steps: first a SELECT query is executed and then CHOOSE selects one
row. Additionally, the PHP code performs some more sanity checks,
<?php
// No code supplied? Why are you calling us?
if(! $_GET[’code’]){
print "Code not specified."; die;
}
// Include common stuff
require_once(’common.php’);
// Fetch code from command line
$vcode = $_GET[’code’];
// Check if code exists in DB
$row = $dbh ->getRow(’SELECT * FROM newsletter_addresses
WHERE confirm_code = ?’, array(md5($vcode)),
DB_FETCHMODE_ASSOC );
// If it doesn’t exist , die
if(!$row[’confirm_code ’]){
print "No such code"; die;
}
// If user is not subscribed ,
// then the confirmation is to subscribe him , so do it
if($row[’subscribed ’] == ’f’){
if(!$dbh ->query(’UPDATE newsletter_addresses
SET subscribed = TRUE , confirm_code = NULL
WHERE confirm_code = ?’,array(md5($vcode )))){
print "Error while accessing database ,
contact system administrator."; die;
};
} else { // Else , code is to unsubscribe him , so do it
if(!$dbh ->query(’DELETE FROM newsletter_addresses
WHERE confirm_code = ?’,array(md5($vcode )))){
print "Error while accessing database ,
contact system administrator."; die;
}
}
print "TRUE";
?>
Figure 5 The code of confirm.php, on which confirm in Fig. 1 is based.
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A.2 Correcting the Error in Panda Source Code
In Section 2 we described a natural correction of the error in the running example. Under
this correction, confirm − corrected satisfies the pre- and postconditions preconfirm and
postconfirm from Fig. 2.
confirm-corrected(cd,subgh):
A = SELECT subscribe FROM NS WHERE code = cd;
if (A = empty) exit; //"No such code"
if (subgh = false) UPDATE NS SET subscribed = true, code = nil WHERE code = cd
else DELETE FROM NS WHERE code = cd;
subgh is no longer a ghost variable. Now it is a second argument to confirm − corrected.
The function subscribe, which had generated URLs calling confirm with one argument, namely
the confirm code, now generates URLs with an additional argument true. Similarly, unsubscribe
generates URLs with the additional argument false.
B The Conference Management Example
In this example we verify parts of a system for conference management which assigns reviewers to
papers and records the reviews and acceptance/rejection decisions. We focus on the earlier parts of
the reviewing process: First, potential reviewers (e.g. PC members) bid on papers to review. Based
on the bids, reviewers are assigned to the papers (e.g. by the PC chair). An additional functionality
of the system that we focus on is displaying the list of papers by a specific author.
B.1 The database
The database contains the following tables and columns:
Papers with columns paperId, status, and session. The column status is over the bounded domain
consisting of undecided, accepted, or rejected. The column session ranges over the bounded
domain consisting of null,blank,invited,1,. . .,k;
PaperAuthor with columns userId and paperId;
ReviewerBids with columns userId and paperId;
ReviewerAssignments with columns userId and paperId;
Conflicts with columns userId and paperId.
The columns userId and paperId range over the unbounded domain. The key of Papers is paperId.
The other tables have a many to many relationship between userId and paperId attesting respectively
to the fact that the user is the author of the paper, the user has bid to review the paper, the user
has been assigned to review the paper, or the user is in conflict with the paper (and therefore cannot
review it).
Before the bidding process begins, all papers are assigned the status undecided and the session
invited (for an invited paper) or null (for a contributed submission). The session value blank comes
up in the display function, and is at the root of a bug in the program.
B.2 The functions bid, assign, and display
The functions bid, assign, and display are referred to as conf-bid, conf-assign, and conf-display
in Table 1. The code of the functions bid, assign, and display can be found in Fig. 6. The function
bid registers that the user usr is willing to review the paper ppr with the sanity check that there is
no conflict between the user and the paper. The table A is either empty whenever no conflict is
found, or contains the single row ppr when there is a conflict. The function assign registers that the
user usr is assigned to review the paper ppr . The function display receives as input the user id usr
and returns the list of papers by usr that should be displayed. If the review phase of the conference
is not yet completed (i.e. the Boolean argument stillReviewing has value true), display removes the
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bid(usr, ppr):
A = SELECT paperId FROM Papers WHERE paperId = ppr AND NOT (paperId IN
(SELECT paperId FROM Conflicts WHERE userId = usr));
if (A = empty) exit;
INSERT (usr, ppr) INTO ReviewerBids
assign(usr,ppr):
INSERT (usr, ppr) INTO ReviewerAssignments
display-incorrect(usr, stillReviewing):
Output = SELECT * FROM Papers WHERE paperId IN
(SELECT paperId FROM PaperAuthor WHERE userId = usr);
if (stillReviewing = false) exit;
UPDATE Output SET session = blank WHERE session IN 1,...,k
display-correct(usr, stillReviewing):
Output = SELECT * FROM Papers WHERE paperId IN
(SELECT paperId FROM PaperAuthor WHERE userId = usr);
if (stillReviewing = false) exit;
UPDATE Output SET session = blank WHERE session IN 1,...,k,null
Figure 6 The code of bid, assign, display-incorrect, and display-correct.
session values of contributed papers from the output. This is done to prevent leaking the information
that a contributed paper has been accepted (since only accepted papers have sessions) before the
status of the paper has been announced. display leaves the status value invited visible.
We present two versions of display: one correct and one incorrect. display-incorrect leaves
the session value null unchanged. Since null and blank are different values, the information leak
which the program tries to avoid is still present. The correct version display-correct differs from
display-incorrect by also replacing the status null by blank. This is done by expanding the
WHERE condition of the UPDATE.
B.3 The specification
The database preserves two invariants:
Inv1 = ∀dx, y.ReviewerBids(x, y)→ ¬Conflicts(x, y)
Inv2 = ∀dx, y.ReviewerAssignments(x, y)→ ¬Conflicts(x, y)
These invariants state that no user may bid or be assigned to review a paper with which they are in
conflict.
The specification of display is as follows:
predisplay = Inv1 ∧ Inv2
postdisplay = Inv1 ∧ Inv2 ∧ no-leak
no-leak = stillReviewing → (∀dx, y.Output(x, y)→ (y = blank ∨ y = invited))
This specification holds for display-correct and does not hold for display-incorrect.
For bid and assign we provide two specifications, one correct and one incorrect. The correct
specification is as follows:
precbid = postcbid = postcassign = Inv1 ∧ Inv2
precassign = Inv1 ∧ Inv2 ∧ ReviewerBids(usr , ppr)
In order to ensure that Inv2 is preserved by assign, we only allow a reviewer assignment to occur if
there was a corresponding reviewer bid. Reviewer bids are required to avoid the conflicts by Inv1,
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and thus Inv2 is preserved. The incorrect specification for bid and assign is as follows:
preicbid = Inv2
preicassign = Inv2 ∧ ReviewerBids(usr , ppr)
postbid = postassign = Inv1 ∧ Inv2
It is obtained from the correct specification by omitting Inv1 from the preconditions.
C The Firewall Example
In this example we verify a simple firewall with respect to a simple invariant. The firewall is provided
with a database consisting of two tables: Device and CanSend. The table Device consists of a
single column deviceId. The table CanSend consists of two columns senderId and receiverId. The
CanSend table determines whether device A is allowed to send to device B.
The global invariant of the firewall requires that there exists a device to which every other device
can send:
Invfirewall = ∃x (Device(x) ∧ ∀y(Device(y)→ CanSend(y, x)))
We want to verify that this invariant holds when the network topology is changed. We consider the
function delete-device:
delete-device(deviceToDelete):
DELETE FROM CanSend WHERE senderId=deviceToDelete OR receiverId=deviceToDelete
DELETE FROM Device WHERE deviceId=deviceToDelete
Table 1 refers to delete-device in the rows labeled firewall. In this table, we experiment with
two specifications. The incorrect specification is:
{Invfirewall} delete− device {Invfirewall}
This specification is incorrect since it is possible that the only device which can receive messages
from all other devices is exactly the device deviceToDelete removed by delete-device. Our correct
specification is:
{predelete−device ∧ Invfirewall} delete− device {Invfirewall}
where
predelete−device = ∃x ((x 6= deviceToDelete) ∧Device(x) ∧ ∀y(Device(y)→ CanSend(y, x)))
This correct specification ensures that there is a device as required which is not deviceToDelete.
C.1 Inflated examples
As a basic test of the scalability of our approach, in Section 5.3 we created large examples by
inflating small examples. Here we illustrate this on the firewall example. The following is the result
of inflating delete-device with multiplier 3. The function delete-device3 deletes three devices
from the network:
delete-device3(deviceToDelete1,deviceToDelete2,deviceToDelete3):
DELETE FROM CanSend WHERE senderId=deviceToDelete1 OR receiverId=deviceToDelete1
DELETE FROM CanSend WHERE senderId=deviceToDelete2 OR receiverId=deviceToDelete2
DELETE FROM CanSend WHERE senderId=deviceToDelete3 OR receiverId=deviceToDelete3
DELETE FROM Device WHERE deviceId=deviceToDelete1
DELETE FROM Device WHERE deviceId=deviceToDelete2
DELETE FROM Device WHERE deviceId=deviceToDelete3
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The specifications must be altered correspondingly, so the precondition of the correct specific-
ation is changed to:
predelete−device3 = ∃x((x 6= deviceToDelete1) ∧ (x 6= deviceToDelete2) ∧ (x 6= deviceToDelete3)
∧Device(x) ∧ ∀y(Device(y)→ CanSend(y, x)))
The other pre- and postconditions remain unchanged, since they just consist of the invariant.
In Table 2, the rows for firewall correspond to the inflated versions of delete-device with the
altered specifications.
D FO2 Reasoning
This appendix gives more detail on the implementation of our FO2 finite satifiability solver. Sec-
tion D.1 gives explicityly the Tseitin transformation of the ∀∀-conjuct from Section 4.2.2. Section D.3
discusses our use of a refined bound on the size of the maximal model due to [21] to improve the
efficiency of the solver.
D.1 The ∀∀-conjunct
Here we give B∀∀ explicitly.
Let ∀x∀y α′ be the unique ∀∀-conjunct of ψ. The CNF formula B∀∀ will have clauses which
explicitly detail the semantics of ∀x∀y α′(x, y) on the structure AS. We associate each sub-formula
γ(x, y) in α′(x, y) and `1, `2 ∈ {1, . . . , bnd(ψ)} with a new Boolean variable uγ`1,`2 . B∀∀ will contain
clauses guaranteeing that under any assignment S satisfying Bψ,
(4) S(uγ`1,`2) = True iff AS |= γ(`1, `2).
Additionally, we add to B∀∀ the clause uα′`1,`2 for all 1 ≤ `1, `2 ≤ bnd(ψ) to assert that α′ is true for
all values of x and y.
It remains to describe the clauses which define the values of uγ`1,`2 according to (4). We
distinguish two cases, depending on whether γ is an atom of ψ or is obtained by applying a Boolean
connective ∨,∧,¬ on sub-formulas. Consider first the case that γ(x, y) = ¬(δ(x, y)). For every
1 ≤ `1, `2 ≤ bnd(ψ), we add the clauses
¬uγ`1,`2 ∨ ¬u
δ
`1,`2 and u
γ
`1,`2
∨ uδ`1,`2
whose conjunction is equivalent to uγ`1,`2 ↔ ¬uδ`1,`2 . The other Boolean connectives are axiomatized
similarly.
For the case of atoms, uγ`1,`2 gets it value from one of the v variables by choosing the indices
correctly:
If γ(x, y) = R(x, y), then for every 1 ≤ `1, `2 ≤ bnd(ψ), uR(x,y)`1,`2 is assigned the same value as
vR,`1,`2 by adding the clauses
¬uR(x,y)`1,`2 ∨ vR,`1,`2 and u
R(x,y)
`1,`2
∨ ¬vR,`1,`2
to Bψ. The conjunction of these two clauses is equivalent to uR(x,y)`1,`2 ↔ vR,`1,`2 .
If γ(x, y) = R(y, x), then uR(x,y)`1,`2 is assigned the same value as vR,`2,`1 .
If γ(x, y) = R(x, x), then uR(x,x)`1,`2 is assigned the same value as vR,`1,`1 .
If γ(x, y) = R(y, y), then uR(y,y)`1,`2 is assigned the same value as vR,`2,`2 .
If γ(x, y) = U(y), then uU(y)`1,`2 is assigned the same value as vU,`2 .
If γ(x, y) = U(x), then uU(x)`1,`2 is assigned the same value as vU,`1 .
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D.2 Axiomatizing models of at size at most bnd(ψ)
Here we continue the discussion postponed to the appendix in Section 4.2.2. Recall that by
Proposition 2, Bψ is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a structure of cardinality exactly bnd(ψ).
However, [21] guarantees only that bnd(ψ) is an upper bound on the cardinality of a satisfying model.
In this appendix we explain how to construct Cψ so that it is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfiable by a
structure of cardinality at most bnd(ψ) as follows.
We compute from ψ a new FO2-sentence Uni(ψ) in SSNF and set Cψ = BUni(ψ). Let Uni be a
fresh unary relation name. Let Uni(ψ) be:
∀x∀y
(
Uniα(x, y) ∧
m+1∧
i=1
Fi(x, y)→ Uniβi(x, y)
)
∧
m+1∧
i=1
∀x∃y Fi(x, y)
with Uniα(x, y) = Uni(x)∧Uni(y)→ α(x, y), Uniβi(x, y) = Uni(x)∧Uni(y)→ βi(x, y), i = 1, . . . ,m,
and Uniβm+1(x, y) = Uni(y). Fm+1 is used to guarantee that Uni is non-empty. Let voc(Uni(ψ))
be the vocabulary of Uni(ψ).
I Proposition 3. Let A be a voc(Uni(ψ))-structure. Let AUni be the substructure of A whose
universe is UniA. We have A |= Uni(ψ) iff AUni |= ψ.
D.3 An efficient finite satisfiability algorithm
The algorithm from Section 4.1 on which our algorithm in Section 4.2 is based was written from a
theoretical point of view aiming to simplify the proof of the NEXPTIME-completeness of the finite
satisfiability problem. In this section, we introduce several optimizations which, while not affecting
the complexity of the problem, improve the performance of our satisfiability solver.
D.3.1 A refined upper bound
In the course of the proof of the bounded model property, [21] give a more refined version of the
upper bound on the size of a minimal satisfying model. This more refine version leads to smaller
upper bounds in many cases. To state the refined upper bound we need some definitions.
I Definition 2. (1-types and kings)
1. A 1-type t(x) is a maximally consistent set of atomic formulas and their negations which do not
have y as a free variable.
2. For a structure A and an element a of the universe of A, the 1-type of a in A is the unique
1-type t(x) such that A |= t(a). We say that a realizes t in A.
3. Given a structure A and an element a of A, a is a king in A if there is no other element in A
with the same 1-type as a.
For example, for a vocabulary consisting of one binary relation name R and one constant name c,
the following is a 1-type:
{R(c, c), R(x, c),¬R(c, x), R(x, x),
¬(x = c),¬(c = x), (x = x), (c = c)}
I Lemma 3 ([21], Theorem 4.3). Let ψ be a sentence in Skolemized Scott Normal Form and let m
be the number of conjuncts of the form ∀x∃y βi as in Eq. (2). Let A be a structure satisfying ψ. Let
K be the set of all kings in A and let P be the set of 1-types realized in A. There is a structure of
cardinality at most
(m+ 1)|K|+ 3m(|P | − |K|) (3)
which satisfies A.
The bound in Lemma 3 requires already having a model of ψ. However, we can use it to get a bound
based on syntactic considerations only. For m ≥ 1, Eq. (3) can be bounded from above by the sum
over all 1-types t(x), such that t(x) contributes (m+ 1) if t(x) contains x = c for some c ∈ const(ψ),
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and 3m otherwise. Note that the number of 1-types containing x = c for some c ∈ const(ψ) in any
one structure is at most |const(ψ)|. Hence, Eq. (3) is at most:
|const(ψ)| (m+ 1) +
∑
t(x)6|=
∨
c∈const(ψ) x=c
3m
(4)
Notice that this bound does not depend on whether the 1-types in the sum are realized in any
structure. It is correct since (1) any 1-type which implies that x = c for any constant is necessarily
a king and thus contributes m+ 1, while (2) any other 1-type, which may or may not be a king,
contributes at most max(m+ 1, 3m) = 3m.
We can now augment the algorithm in Section 4.2 to use the refined bound from Eq. (4). Our
algorithm uses Proposition 1 to transform a FO2-sentence φ into Scott Normal Form, which adds a
new relation name for every quantifier and every connective in φ. This comes at a heavy cost to
performance, since the number of 1-types summed over in Eq. (4) is exponential in the number of
relation and constant names in Scott Normal Form of φ. In this section we provide a more economic
procedure for this purpose, which introduces new relation names only as a last resort.
Given a FO2-sentence φ, we construct a sentence ψ in Scott Normal Form such that φ and ψ are
satisfiable by models of the same cardinalities. We construct a sequence of pairs (φk, ψk), 1 ≤ k ≤ r
as follows. The sequence is built according to the process described below. The length r of the
sequence is determined by applying the process until no further steps can be applied. The sequence
satisfies:
– φ0 is the Negation Normal Form6 of φ and
ψ0 = ∀x∀y True,
– φr = True and ψr = ψ,
– ψk is in Scott Normal Form for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r, and
– the sets of cardinalities of the models of φk ∧ ψk are equal for all 1 ≤ k ≤ r.
Given (φk, ψk) we compute (φk+1, ψk+1) iteratively as follows:
1. If φk is in one of the forms:
∀xQy  ∀x 
∀yQx  ∀y 
where  is quantifier-free and Q is a quantifier, i.e. Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, then ψk+1 is obtained from ψk as
follows. If Q = ∀, ψk+1 is obtained by adding  as a new conjunct inside the quantifiers ∀x∀y. If
Q = ∃, ψk+1 is obtained by adding a new conjunct ∀x∃y  or ∀y∃x  to ψk. We set φk+1 to True.
We end the iteration by setting r to k + 1,
2. If φk is a conjunction in which one of the conjuncts γ is of one of the forms in the previous
item, then ψk+1 is obtained from ψk as in the previous item and φk+1 is obtained from φk by
removing γ from the conjunction.
3. If there is an existential quantifier not in the scope of any other quantifier in φk, then φk+1 is
obtained by removing the existential quantifier and replacing all the occurrences of the quantified
variable bound to this quantifier with one fresh constant name. We set ψk+1 = ψk. Note for the
correctness of this step that we are using here that the formulas are in Negation Normal Form,
i.e. this existential quantifier may be in the scope of the ∧ and ∨ operators only.
4. If φk is of one of the following forms, or if φk is a conjunction in which one of the conjuncts γ is
of one of the following forms:
∀z1 ((Qz2 δ1) ∨ δ2)
∀z1 ((Qz2 δ1) ∧ δ2)
∀z1 (δ1 ∨ (Qz2 δ2))
∀z1 (δ1 ∧ (Qz2 δ2))
6 An FO formula is in Negation Normal Form (NNF) if the scope of every negation symbol ¬ is an atom.
It is well-known that for every FO formula γ, an equivalent formula γ′ in NNF can be computed in
linear time.
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where Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, z1, z2 ∈ {x, y} and z1 6= z2, φk+1 is obtained by taking the quantifier Qz2 out
of the scope of the Boolean connective. E.g., we substitute ∀z1((Qz2δ1)∨δ2) with ∀z1Qz2(δ1∨δ2).
We set ψk+1 = ψk. Note for the correctness of this step that the δj not in the scope of Q does
not have z2 as a free variable, since we are dealing with sentences.
5. If φk is quantifier-free, ψk+1 is obtained from ψk by adding φk as a new conjunct inside the
quantifiers ∀x∀y in ψk. We set φk+1 to True and end the process by setting r = k + 1.
6. If none of the previous items applied to φk in this iteration, we eliminate one quantifier from
φk in spirit of the discussion before Proposition 3.1 in [21]. Let γ be a sub-formula of φk of
the form Qz δ, where Q ∈ {∃, ∀}, z ∈ {x, y} and δ is quantifier-free. Let z¯ ∈ {x, y} such that
z 6= z¯. The sentence φk+1 is obtained by substituting γ by E(z¯) in φk, where E is a fresh unary
relation name. Let θ = ∀z¯ ((Qzδ) ↔ E(z¯)). The sentence θ says that E is interpreted as the
set of universe elements u for which Qzδ holds. θ is equivalent to the conjunction of θ∀∀ and
θ∀∃ such that θ∀∀ is of the form ∀x∀y θ′∀∀ and θ∀∃ is of the form ∀x∃y θ′∀∃, and θ′∀∀ and θ′∀∃ are
quantifier-free. Let ψk+1 be obtained by adding the conjunct θ∀∃ to φk and adding θ′∀∀ as a new
conjunct inside the ∀∀-conjunct of φk.
Only item 6 increases the number of names, so it is only used when no other item applies. The
procedure terminates because every item, except for item 4, removes a quantifier when going from
φk to φk+1, and whenever item 4 is applied, in the next iteration either item 1 or item 2 will be
applied.
D.3.2 Ruling out unfeasible 1-types
Up until now, we have bounded the number of 1-types which are realized in some structure A
satisfying φ with the number of all 1-types. However, it is possible to determine that some 1-types
are not feasible in any structure satisfying φ and subtract them from the upper bound.
Recall the table NS from the running example in Section 2. NS(x, y) expresses that user y is
subscribed to newsletter x. It is natural that the requirement that users and newsletters are disjoint
∀x ((∃yNS(x, y))→ (∀y ¬NS(y, x)))
is part of the database invariant. Hence, any 1-type containing NS(x, x) is unfeasible.
Let ψ be a sentence in Scott Normal Form such that ψ = ψ∀∀ ∧ ψ∀∃, where ψ∀∀ = (∀x∀y α)
and ψ∀∃ is a conjunction of terms of the form ∀x∃y βi. Any 1-type which is not feasible for ψ∀∀ is
certainly not feasible for ψ. Since ψ∀∀ is a universal FO sentence, it adheres to a classical property
of universal FO: the class of models of ψ∀∀ is closed under taking substructures. This implies that
any feasible 1-type of ψ∀∀ occurs in a structure of cardinality 1. We count the number of unfeasible
1-types which do not contain x = c for any constant name by iterating over all such 1-types t(x)
and checking satisfiability of ∀x t(x) ∧ ψ∀∀ by a structure of cardinality 1.
D.3.3 Improved satisfiability testing
The size of the input and the run time of the SAT solver depend on the size of the upper bound
bnd(ψ) on the cardinality of the minimal satisfying model, if such a model exists. To guarantee
that ψ is unsatisfiable, one must verify that no satisfying model up to that cardinality exists. In
contrast, to guarantee that ψ is satisfiable, it is enough to find a satisfying model, which may be
much smaller than the bound. Hence, instead of performing the satisfiability test for models of
cardinality up to bnd(ψ), we iteratively search for models whose cardinalities 1 = a0, . . . , ae ≤ bnd(ψ)
increase exponentially up to bnd(ψ). For each ai, we construct a CNF formula Cai similar to Cψ,
only replacing the maximal cardinality bnd(ψ) with ai, and apply the SAT solver to Cai . We
have that ai = 2ai−1 for every 2 ≤ i < e and ae = min(bnd(ψ), 2ae−1). The search continues
until either we reach the index e for which ae = bnd(ψ) or Cae is satisfiable, and the algorithm
returns the truth-value of Cae . This procedure is very often much faster for satisfiable inputs ψ.
For unsatisfiable inputs, the run time increase is negligible, since the formulas Ca0 , . . . , Cae−1 are
exponentially smaller than Cae = Cψ.
